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UNITY IN CHINA NEEDED FOR DEFEAT OF JAPANESE ARMY

THE dismissal of the chiefs of the Japanese Army and Navy general staffs, announced in Tokyo on February 21, attests to the progress that is being made against the enemy in Asia. Plainly, the period of the slow defensive-offensive, dating from the invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942, is over as far as the Pacific Fleet is concerned. During the present month the enemy in Asia has been hit hard from many directions. We have taken Kwajalein and Eniwetok atolls in the Marshalls, have shelled Paramushiru, Rabaul and Kavieng by sea for the first time, and have sunk at least 19 Japanese vessels and destroyed more than 200 Japanese planes in a bold carrier-based air attack on Truk, the enemy's "Pearl Harbor" in the South Pacific. The continuity of these movements, the vast area they cover and the depth of their penetration into Japan's oceanic empire justify the statement by Secretary of the Navy Knox that our surface craft "go where they please."

CHINA THE MAIN FRONT. But if the Japanese Navy is meeting its match, this cannot yet be said of the enemy Army, entrenched in a vast land domain from Manchuria to Burma. Recently two top American commanders have emphasized in specific terms the nature of the task that lies ahead on the continent of Asia. On February 8 Admiral Chester W. Nimitz told newspapermen: "My objective is to get ground and air forces into China as soon as possible. I don't believe Japan can be defeated from the sea alone." To this he added the unequivocal declaration: "I believe Japan can be defeated only from bases in China."

Five days later, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell declared that Admiral Nimitz's naval drive across the Pacific to the China coast "must be supported heavily by an aggressive Allied land and air offensive projected from the interior." Asserting that "vital China-based air operations cannot wait for a

penetration of the blockade by land or sea," he stated that facilities are being prepared inside China to service "the largest and newest cargo carriers available."

CONDITIONS IN CHUNGKING. These re-affirmations of China's decisive position in Pacific strategy must heighten American interest in that country's internal situation, which has been very difficult for a long time. The United States will naturally welcome any developments that tend to strengthen the hard-pressed Chinese government and armed forces for the trials that lie ahead.

But such developments appear to be few and far between. In the economic sphere inflation is reaching increasingly fantastic levels as a result of the Japanese blockade, the limitations of domestic production, and the absence of an effective policy against hoarders and speculators. Recently Chungking food prices rose 22 per cent in one week, a phenomenal jump reportedly linked to extraordinary spending after the annual settlement of debts at New Year's time. Of course, inflation is not as serious a matter as it would be if China had a highly industrialized economy rather than its present decentralized agricultural system. But Chinese prices are now well over 200 times above their pre-war levels, and the effects—limited for a time to urban centers—are being felt increasingly among the peasants, who constitute the backbone of the nation and its war effort.

On the political front the news that Finance Minister H. H. Kung has replaced Foreign Minister T. V. Soong as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of China appears of unusual significance, although detailed information about the change is lacking. Dr. Soong, an outstanding banker, has long been regarded abroad as one of China's most modern, efficient and incorruptible leaders. His loss of a post held since 1935 seems to be a personal and political triumph for his brother-in-law, Dr. Kung,

who, in addition to being Finance Minister and Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, is also Governor of the Central Bank of China. Whether Dr. Soong will remain in office as Foreign Minister now becomes a question of considerable interest.

PROBLEMS OF UNITY. Relations between the Chungking government and the Chinese Communists continue to trouble the internal situation. Both are fighting Japan, but have not succeeded in re-establishing the unity that existed between them during the first few years of resistance. Since 1940 Chungking has maintained a strict blockade against the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, which is the supply base and headquarters area of the Communist-led Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

Recently the issue of the blockade came to the fore when Mme. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the famous Chinese nationalist leader and sister of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, issued a statement in which she attacked "the diversion of part of our national army to the task of blockading and 'guarding' the guerrilla

areas." On February 16 Dr. K. C. Wu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, admitted that Central troops are stationed in the Northwest, but declared that he regards them as police forces rather than as blockading armies.

The formulation of a compromise for the adjustment of internal differences is China's affair, but the United States would have every reason to welcome a settlement at the earliest possible moment. The military situation demands it, for the separation of important northern areas from the rest of fighting China is an obstacle to defeat of the enemy. If China is to serve with full effectiveness as the decisive land and air front against Japan, its entire territory should be available for unified operations; and sections of its troops should not be engaged in watching each other rather than the invader. In the Far East, as in Europe, the attainment of political harmony is essential to rapid and complete victory in battle.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

AMERICAN PEOPLE DISTURBED BY SILENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

While the speed and striking power of our operations in the Pacific already exceed the most optimistic calculations for this stage of the war, both the political and military situation in Europe remain in a state of deadlock that only a large-scale Allied invasion can break. The sobering effect of the struggle for the Italian beachheads is due not merely to a loss of lives seemingly out of proportion to the results thus far achieved. It is due primarily to the inescapable conclusion that, unless Germany suffers an as yet unforeseeable internal collapse, the struggle for other bridgeheads into Europe may prove equally arduous and bitter.

But, as we face the grim days ahead, we must constantly endeavor to see them in the perspective of still grimmer days already experienced by the peoples of conquered Europe. The men and women of our generation have many ordeals in store for them. But few ordeals can outmatch, in terms of frustration, the surrender at Munich or, in terms of sheer desperation, the evacuation of Dunkerque, the German break-through at Sedan, the siege of Stalin-grad. Knowledge of what the human spirit has already endured in our lifetime should steel us for whatever the future may yet disclose.

It cannot be repeated too often, however, that our capacity for endurance would be enhanced manyfold if we could look to the coming months and years not only with grim determination but with faith and buoyancy. It is this quality of buoyancy, this assurance that the war is being fought not merely for physical survival, but for enlargement of the lives we are seeking to preserve, that gives such drive to the Russians in spite of nearly three years of exhausting war, and lends unflinching courage to Europe's

underground movements. That is also why it is of such paramount importance that the United States, as invasion nears, should become identified as clearly as possible not with the forces in Europe that symbolize weariness and decay, but with the vigorous new forces crystallized by resistance to Nazi rule. Yet even now, at the zero hour, when it is obvious that political weapons will prove at least as decisive as military operations in deciding the future of the continent, the United States officially appears reluctant to show open sympathy for the anti-Fascist elements whose unremitting efforts have prevented consolidation of Hitler's "new order." And while we ourselves continue to maintain ambiguous relations with Fascist sympathizers, for example, in Spain—not to speak of the supporters of King Victor Emmanuel of Italy—we paradoxically expect the countries of Latin America to reject Axis influence so as to strengthen our own position in the Western Hemisphere.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY LACKING. Military considerations can be invoked to justify many moves that would otherwise appear highly disheartening. But military considerations do not justify lack of a basic philosophy in our approach to the moral crisis of our times. On the contrary, persistent opportunism in our relations with conquered Europe can only produce a weary cynicism, both here and abroad—a cynicism which in itself could become a grave military liability for the United Nations. The silence of President Roosevelt and other American officials on the political trends that have been rapidly developing on the continent since Teheran can, of course, be explained by calculated circumspection on the eve of invasion. Or it may be considered unwise

to discuss controversial issues of foreign policy in an election year. True, the President may think that indirect measures, such as the arrangements about Arabian oil, may do more to make it impossible for this country to return to isolation after the war than any further statements of policy. Whatever the reason for this silence, the net effect is to bewilder and depress public opinion here at the very moment when its full—and above all fully informed—support is essential for impending operations. And meanwhile the available physical strength of those who are resisting Hitler within the “fortress of Europe” is understandably running out, due to shortages of both food and arms.

At this juncture, announcement on February 18 of the Baruch report on post-war preparations for this country's reconversion to peacetime conditions seems to put the cart before the horse. It is true that international reconstruction will depend not on ourselves alone, but on the collaboration of other na-

tions, and therefore appears less directly feasible than reconstruction at home. But the Baruch report, quite rightly, states that the question asked by everyone is: “How am I going to make a living for myself and for those dear to me when the war is over, in a manner of my own choosing?” What it does not point out is that the war will not in actuality be “over,” nor will anyone have much “choosing” of his or her own to do, unless the United Nations succeed in achieving a measure of stability in world affairs. The Baruch report strikes a welcome note of optimism when it says: “There is no need for post-war depression.” But hope for the future would run even higher if this country were to take the lead in saying, with equal confidence: “There is no need for post-war international anarchy”—and act on this belief. To avoid discussion of this issue, even in an election year, is to do less than justice to the courage and common sense of the American people.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

How To Think About War and Peace, by Mortimer J. Adler. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1944. \$2.50

Rigorously logical demonstration that perpetual world peace is an actual possibility but capable of being realized only if genuine world federation is established. Recognizing the nations' present concern with their sovereignty as an enormous obstacle, the author nevertheless believes steps toward establishing the world state can be taken now—although complete results may not be achieved for 500 years or so.

The White Brigade, by Robert Goffin. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$2.00

Dramatic story of Belgian underground groups.

New Zealand, by Walter Nash. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943. \$3.50

A picture of the smallest of the British Dominions at peace and at war by the New Zealand Minister to the United States. Of particular interest are Mr. Nash's ideas on world organization and the liquidation of imperialism in the Pacific.

What is the Western economic stake in Asia? How much would it cost the metropolitan countries to give up their empires in the East? How will the rest of the world adjust itself to the rise of new nations in a free and industrialized Asia? READ—

INDEPENDENCE FOR COLONIAL ASIA— THE COST TO THE WESTERN WORLD

by Lawrence K. Rosinger

25c

February 1 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

REPORTS are issued on the 1st and 15th of each month.

Subscription \$5; to F.P.A. members, \$3.

One Continent Redeemed, by Guy Ramsey. Garden City, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1943. \$2.50

One of the more worth-while books in the flood generated by the North African campaign. The author writes dramatically and with understanding of the tangled political situation.

These Are the Generals. New York, Knopf, 1943. \$2.50

Biographical vignettes of seventeen prominent American military chiefs.

Latin America and the United States, by Graham S. Stuart, fourth edition, thoroughly revised. New York, Appleton-Century, 1943. \$5.00

Brings up to date a useful reference text.

Empire, by Louis Fischer. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943. \$1.00

A stimulating and forceful discussion of India and imperialism by a journalist who argues for rapid realization of colonial independence. At the same time, some of the author's judgments on the prospects of Anglo-Soviet-U.S.-Chinese cooperation for a better world seem wide of the mark after the Moscow, Cairo and Teheran conferences.

Come Over Into Macedonia, by Harold B. Allen. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1943. \$3.00

This reference book on the successful rural reconstruction of Macedonia during the period 1928-38 by a director of the Near East Relief Foundation's project should be useful to those planning to do similar work after the war.

The Journey into the Fog, by Cornelia Goodhue. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1944. \$2.50

Dramatizes a bit the facts of Vitus Bering's life and the voyage in which he opened the Bering Sea and established Russia's claims.

The Hidden Enemy: The German Threat to Post-War Peace, by Heinz Pol. New York, Julian Messner, 1943. \$3.00


Strong indictment of Pan-Germanism as the movement which must be crushed to end the possibility of Germany's again causing war.

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Washington News Letter



FEB. 21.—In this war, as in others, democratic governments have suffered from the illusion that they can prevent political disturbance by suppressing information. The censorship issue has just been sharpened by reports from London that the British government, with the support of our State Department, has appointed two Foreign Office officials to the British censorship office to strengthen controls on outgoing news of a political nature; and by attempts of Allied commanders in Italy to restrict the news correspondents may send from the Anzio beachhead.

POLITICAL CENSORSHIP IN WAR. The London reports have not been confirmed by British sources, and Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr., said on February 15 that the State Department had not requested the assignment of the Foreign Office officials. But the war's history provides previous instances of political censorship. On March 26, 1942, for example, Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information, told the House of Commons that censorship would be used to keep dispatches from going abroad which were "calculated to foment ill-feeling between the United Nations or between them and a neutral country." Without making a public announcement like Mr. Bracken's, the American government has practiced a rigid censorship on news of events likely to put the United States in a poor light abroad. To mention only one instance, cables reporting the Detroit race riots last June were held up two days.

The facts of diplomatic disagreement cannot long be hidden, and their divulgence after suppression only heightens their disturbing effect. Political censorship, moreover, is contrary to the principles of democratic society, which strengthens itself through discussion and the free flow of opinion and information. Formally, the basic consideration of censorship in the United States is military security, but this consideration is often stretched until, as at Anzio, censorship is invoked to bolster civilian morale on the home front. That sort of censorship, if successful, limits the civilian's appreciation of the true seriousness of the conflict.

Official professions of distaste for excessive political and military censorship have been common during the war. On December 7, 1941, the day Japan attacked the United States, Brig. Gen. Alexander Surles, chief of War Department public relations, said: "I will do my best to get the news out as rapidly as I can." Secretary of State Cordell Hull in

November 1942, wrote Byron Price, Director of Censorship: "I feel that fundamentally the long range interests of international friendship are best served by permitting the people of any country to know what people in friendly countries are thinking and saying about them, however unpleasant some of those opinions may be."

Nevertheless, the censors continue to perform their tasks in a manner which brings protests from correspondents that the restrictions go beyond the needs of military security. As General Surles spoke, the facts about the attack on Pearl Harbor were being wrapped in a censorship blanket that even today has been only partially removed. On December 10, 1943, when the United States censorship code was relaxed after two years of war, Byron Price reported that in many instances news was being suppressed "for no apparent reason."

MILITARY CENSORSHIP FOR HOME MORALE. The Anzio case illustrates the difficulties which governments and military establishments run into when they try to bend facts to serve an end. Since Pearl Harbor, the American people alternately have been told they are too hopeful or too gloomy. On the gloomy side, Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson said on February 10 that the danger to American and British troops at Anzio was "not to be minimized." The next day President Roosevelt told his press conference that the situation at Anzio was very tense. The reports of correspondents at the beachhead reflected that view.

Concerned by the gloom that spread in this country, the command of Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, leading the Fifth Army, on February 15 forbade correspondents to use the radio at the Anzio beachhead for transmitting their dispatches. This amounted to censorship by delay, and a system of political censorship on Anzio stories was organized at Naples. In Washington Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson said on February 17 that General Alexander was in the best position to judge his own censorship requirements. But the implication that the Anzio censorship decision was made elsewhere than in Italy was seen in General Alexander's remark that his superiors had notified him of the damage being done to civilian morale in Britain and the United States. Director of War Information Elmer Davis, who holds that only information actually jeopardizing military security is to be suppressed, has said he will investigate the imposition of a censorship aimed at preventing home-front alarm. **BLAIR BOLLES**

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